Free will - you only think you have it
04 May 2006
Exclusive from New Scientist Print Edition.
Zeeya Merali
"WE MUST believe
in free will,
we have no choice," the novelist Isaac Bashevis Singer
once said. He might as well have said, "We must believe
in quantum mechanics,
we have no choice," if two new studies are anything
to go by.
Early last month, a Nobel laureate physicist finished
polishing up his theory that a deeper, deterministic
reality underlies the apparent uncertainty
of quantum mechanics. A week after he
announced it, two eminent mathematicians showed that the
theory has profound implications beyond physics: abandoning
the uncertainty of quantum
physics means we must give up the cherished
notion that we have free
will. The mathematicians believe
the physicist is wrong.
"It's
striking that we have one of the greatest scientists of
our generation pitted against two of the world's greatest
mathematicians," says Hans Halvorson, a philosopher
of physics at Princeton University.
Quantum
mechanics is widely accepted by physicists,
but is full of apparent paradoxes, which made Einstein
deeply uncomfortable and have never been resolved. For
instance, you cannot ask what the spin of a particle was
before you made an observation of it - quantum
mechanics says the spin was undetermined.
And you cannot predict the outcome of an experiment; you
can only estimate the probability of getting a certain
result.
"Quantum
mechanics works wonderfully well, but
it's not complete," says Gerard
't Hooft of Utrecht University in the
Netherlands, who won the Nobel prize for physics in 1999
for laying the mathematical foundations for the standard
model of particle physics. One major reason why many physicists,
including 't Hooft,
yearn for a deeper view
of reality than quantum mechanics can
offer is their failure so far to unite quantum theory
with general relativity and its description of gravity,
despite enormous effort. "A radical change
is needed," says 't Hooft.
For more than
a decade now, 't Hooft
has been working on the idea that there is a hidden
layer of reality at scales smaller than
the so-called Planck length of 10^-35 metres. 't
Hooft has developed a mathematical model
to support this notion. At this deeper level, he says,
we cannot talk of particles or waves to describe reality,
so he defines entities called "states" that
have energy. In his model, these states behave predictably
according to deterministic
laws, so it is theoretically possible
to keep tabs on them.
However, the
calculations show that individual states can be tracked
for only about 10^-43 seconds, after which many states
coalesce into one final state, which is what creates the
quantum mechanical uncertainty. Our measurements illuminate
these final states, but because the prior information
is lost, we can't recreate their precise history.
While 't
Hooft's initial theory explained most
quantum mechanical oddities,
such as the impossibility of precisely measuring both
the location and momentum of a particle, it had a major
stumbling block - the states could end up with negative
energy, which is physically impossible. Now, 't
Hooft has worked out a solution that overcomes
this problem, preventing the states from having negative
energy (www.arxiv.org/quant-ph/0604008).
"It was an obnoxious difficulty," he says. "But
having solved it I am more and more convinced that this
is the right approach."
Essentially,
't Hooft is
saying that while particles in Quantum
mechanics seem to behave unpredictably,
if we could track the underlying states, we can predict
the behaviour of particles.
Others are impressed.
"This is a very beautiful theory that tells us about
the world on the smallest scales," says physicist
Willem de Muynck at Eindhoven University of Technology
in the Netherlands. "But these are scales that current
experiments cannot reach, so if anything the theory is
before its time."
As enticing
as 't Hooft's theory
may be to physicists, it has an unexpected and potentially
frightful consequence for the rest
of us. Mathematicians John
Conway and Simon
Kochen, both at Princeton University,
say that any deterministic
theory underlying quantum mechanics robs
us of our free will.
"When
you choose to eat the chocolate cake or the plain one,
are you really free to decide?" asks Conway.
In other words, could someone who has been tracking all
the particle interactions in the universe predict with
perfect accuracy the cake you will pick? The answer, it
seems, depends on whether Quantum
mechanics' inherent uncertainty is the
correct description of reality
or 't Hooft
is right in saying that beneath that uncertainty there
is a deterministic order.
Conway
and Kochen explored the implications of
't Hooft's theory
by looking at what happens when you measure the spin of
a particle. Spin is always measured along three perpendicular
axes. For a spherical particle, the particular axes that
you choose and the order in which you carry out the measurements
are up to you. But are your choices a matter of free
will, or are they predetermined?
What the mathematicians
proved is this: if you have the slightest freedom to choose
the axes and order of measurement, then particles everywhere
must also have the same degree of freedom. That means
they can behave unpredictably.
However, if particles have no
freedom, as implied by 't
Hooft's theory, the mathematicians proved
that you have no real say in the choice of axes and order
of measurement. In other words, deterministic
particles put an end to
free will (www.arxiv.org/quant-ph/0604079).
Arguments about
free will are as old as philosophy itself,
and ever since quantum mechanics
was proposed people have attempted to connect free will
to the indeterminacy at the heart of this theory. "We're
proud because this is the first solid proof relating these
issues," says Conway.
Kochen
and Conway
stress that their theorem doesn't disprove 't
Hooft's theory. It simply states that
if his theory is true, our actions cannot be free. And
they admit that there's no way for us to tell. "Our
lives could be like the second showing of a movie - all
actions play out as though they are free, but that freedom
is an illusion," says Kochen.
Since the mathematicians
believe that we have free
will, it follows for them that 't
Hooft's theory must be wrong. "We
have to believe in free will to do anything," says
Conway.
"I believe I am free to drink this cup of coffee,
or throw it across the room. I believe I am free in choosing
to have this conversation."
Halvorson says
the debate really boils down to a matter of personal taste.
"Kochen and Conway
can't tolerate the idea that our future may already be
settled," he says, "but people like 't
Hooft and Einstein
find the notion that the universe can't be completely
described by physics just as disturbing."
For philosophers,
both arguments can be troubling. "Quantum
randomness as the basis of
free will doesn't really give us control
over our actions," says Tim Maudlin, a philosopher
of physics at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, New
Jersey. "We're either
deterministic machines,
or we're random machines.
That's not much of a choice."
Halvorson, however,
welcomes the work by 't
Hooft, Conway
and Kochen.
"Philosophy has separated itself from
science for far too long," he says.
"There are very important questions to be asked about
free will, and maybe physics can answer
them."
Printed on Mon May 22 07:21:21 BST 2006
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